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Recent Developments 
Bentley v. Carroll 
Jury Instructions Stating that Statutory Violations Are Evidence of Negligence 
Are Permissible 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
medical patient was entitled to a jury 
instruction stating that the violation of 
a statute may be considered evidence 
of negligence. Bentley v. Carroll, 
355 Md. 312, 734 A.2d 697 (1999). 
Moreover, the court concluded that 
when ajury is determining causation 
in a medical malpractice case, it may 
consider non-expert as well as expert 
medical testimony. The court of 
appeals also held that an expert may 
not offer an opinion as to the 
truthfulness of a party, but may only 
offer an opinion based on the facts 
sufficient to show the basis for that 
opinion. 
Beginning in 1978 and 
continuing until 1988, then two-year 
old Christine Ann Bentley ("Bentley'') 
received medical treatment from Dr. 
Alan Carroll ("Carroll") and the late 
Dr. GeorgeL. Morningstar for a series 
of afflictions including urination 
problems and vaginal inflammation. 
During this same ten-year period, 
Bentley had allegedly been sexually 
abused by her mother's boyfriend on 
a regular basis. 
In 1996, Bentley filed suit 
against Carroll, the estate of George 
L. Morningstar, and Morningstar and 
Carroll, P .A., in the Circuit Court for 
Frederick County, alleging medical 
malpra9tice. Bentley claimed that 
Carroll breached the standard of 
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medical care by failing to report, as 
required by Article 27, section 35A 
of the Maryland Annotated Code that 
the sexual abuse of a child was 
possibly occurring. Bentley proposed 
the jury instruction that violation of a 
statute could be considered evidence 
of negligence which the trial court 
refused. The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of Carroll, and a timely appeal 
was noted to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, sua sponte, 
granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by examining Article 27, 
section 35A of the Maryland 
Annotated Code, Maryland's Child 
Abuse Act, and Bentley's proposed 
jury instruction. Bentley, 355 Md. at 
318,320, 734 A.2d at 701-02. In 
examining Bentley's proposed 
instructions in conjunction with 
Maryland Rule 2-520, the court 
opined that a requested jury instruction 
should be given only if (1) the 
instruction correctly states the law; (2) 
the matter at issue is not fairly covered 
by an instruction already given; and 
(3) the law is applicable in light of the 
evidence before the jury. Id at 324-
25, 734 A.2d at 704 (citing Holman 
v. Kelly Catering, 334 Md. 480, 639 
A.2d 701 (1994». Afterapplyingthis 
standard to Bentley's proposed 
instruction, the court rej ected 
Carroll's argument that it would be 
inappropriate to include section 35A 
in ajury instruction. Id at 326, 734 
A.2d 705. Rather, the court of 
appeals found that the trial court 
erred, in that Bentley's proposed jury 
instruction should have been given. 
Id. The court of appeals concluded 
Bentley's proposed instruction was 
legally accurate and its inclusion of 
section 35A was appropriate given 
the evidence in the instant case. Id 
Before continuing, the court 
noted that it could have remanded the 
case solely on the jury instruction 
error, but in the interest of providing 
guidance for future parties, it would 
address the other issues raised by 
Bentley. Id at 329, 734A.2dat707. 
The court then considered whether 
the jury should have been instructed 
that it could consider non-expert, as 
well as expert testimony, in 
determining causation. Id at 329-
30, 734 A.2d at 707. The court 
found that an instruction to ajury is 
erroneous if it restricts evidence that 
tends to establish material facts. Id 
at 331, 734 A.2d at 708 (quoting 
Singleton v. Roman, 195 Md. 241, 
72 A.2d 705 (1950». Therefore, 
the court of appeals held in the instant 
case, that the trial judge improperly 
limited the scope of deliberations by 
only allowing the jury to consider 
expert testimony in determining 
causation. Id The court concluded 
that the jury should have been 
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permitted to consider non-expert 
material such as interrogatories and 
depositions which may have shed light 
on material facts in the case. Id 
The court of appeals then 
examined whether the trial court erred 
in not striking the testimony of an 
expert witness who called into 
question the victim's veracity. Id at 
332, 734 A.2d at 708-09. The expert 
testified that based on the results of a 
professionally accepted test, Bentley 
exhibited no signs of an individual who 
had suffered sexual abuse and may 
have exaggerated her symptoms. Id 
at 333, 734 A.2d at 709. The expert 
further stated that he based his 
conclusions on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
("MMPI") test which functioned as a 
"mini truth, or lie detector .... " Id 
The court noted that in Maryland, 
courts are not the proper forum for 
the introduction or interpretation of 
devices that measure a witness's 
veracity. Id. at 334, 734 A.2d at 709 
(citing Guesfeirdv. State, 300 Md. 
653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984)). The 
court additionally stated that Maryland 
courts have consistently held that an 
expert witness may not give his 
opinion as to the truthfulness of a 
witness. Id at 334, 734 A.2d at 709-
1 0 (citing Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 
266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988)). In the 
instant case, the court held Carroll's 
expert's reliance on what he perceived 
to be a "truth detector," coupled with 
his comments as to the veracity of 
Bentley, were impermissibly 
prejudicial and thus, inadmissible as a 
matter oflaw. Id. at 335, 734 A.2d 
at 710. 
Finally, the court addressed 
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whether Bentley's expert's opinion 
that Bentley's injuries were the result 
of sexual abuse was admissible. Id 
The court first noted that an expert 
witness may not offer an opinion 
based solely on the complainant's 
version of the cause of his or her 
injuries. Id at 330, 734 A.2d at 710 
(citing Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 
266,539 A.2d 657 (1988)). Rather, 
the expert opinion must be based on 
facts that sufficiently show the basis 
for their opinion. Id In the instant 
case, the court of appeals found that 
the expert witness based his opinion 
on facts that were insufficient to 
support his testimony. Id at336, 734 
A.2d at 711. As a result, his testimony 
that Bentley's injuries were the result 
of sexual abuse impermissibly 
bolstered the credibility and argument 
of Bentley. !d. at 338, 734 A.2d at 
712. 
The court of appeals's holding 
in Bentley supports the rights of those 
seeking redress for sexual abuse. The 
court clearly articulated that abuse 
victims are entitled to a jury instruction 
that considers a violation of 
Maryland's Child Abuse Act as 
evidence of negligence. This decision 
will make it easier for victims to show 
a breach of the standard of care by 
physicians, in that it expands the 
amount of evidence that juries can 
consider. In addition,juries will not 
be restricted solely to considering 
expert testimony, but will be allowed 
to consider non-expert testimony that 
might emotionally swing ajury. 
